Contested Eviction

Aurora Borunda mortgaged her property with Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp. in 2007, granting a $117,000 Deed of Trust. Financial Freedom had the right to accelerate the debt upon Borunda’s death – a typical event of default in most mortgages.

The Deed of Trust also stated that if the property is sold at foreclosure, any person holding possession shall immediately surrender the property to the buyer at the foreclosure sale. And if they do not surrender it, that person is a “tenant at sufferance” and may be removed by writ of possession.

Those are also typical provisions in virtually all Texas mortgages.

Aurora Borunda died on September 21, 2011. The property was sold at foreclosure to The Federal National Mortgage Association on January 8, 2013. You know TFNMA as Fannie Mae.

Aurora’s daughter Linda Borunda continued to reside at the property. So Fannie Mae sent Linda a written demand for possession on January 25, 2013, and then filed an eviction lawsuit on February 8.

The Justice Court granted Judgment for the Plaintiff Fannie Mae. Linda appealed.

At a new trial in El Paso, the County Court also granted Judgment for Fannie. Linda Borunda appealed. Again.

Linda claimed that the El Paso County Court lacked jurisdiction because of a title dispute and as a consequence, the Deed of Trust’s tenancy-at-sufferance clause is unenforceable against her. Specifically, Linda claimed that Financial Freedom violated the terms of the Deed of Trust by failing to provide her with adequate notice of the foreclosure sale.

As a result of the inadequate notice and according to Linda, Financial Freedom had no right to conduct the foreclosure sale. If Linda was correct in her assertion, then Fannie Mae’s interest is void and it had no authority to cause Linda to be evicted because only property owners and their managers may evict.

The Court readily admitted that Linda might have raised a legitimate title issue. However, defects in the foreclosure process are not relevant to eviction claims. Such defects must be raised separately. In another lawsuit. In District Court.

Fannie Mae’s Deed granted by Financial Freedom at the foreclosure sale is sufficient evidence of ownership for purposes of an eviction case. Title defects in the foreclosure sale as between Financial Freedom and Fannie Mae are not recognizable in the limited eviction proceeding as between Linda and deed-holder Fannie Mae.

Fannie Mae bought the property at a foreclosure sale. The underlying Deed of Trust had a tenant-at-sufferance clause that could allow a Justice Court to determine the right of immediate possession independently of title.

Fannie Mae wins. Again.

Linda Borunda loses. Again.

See Borunda v. Federal National Mortgage Association; Cause No. 08-13-00331-CV; Texas Court of Appeals; 8^th District; December 8, 2015.

Lessons learned:

1.      We handle many tenant evictions at my Firm. This El Paso Court easily ruled for the Landlord / property purchaser. However, I have seen other courts struggle with this issue and this is why it is a favored strategy of tenants to claim a title defect in an eviction lawsuit.

2.      In order to avoid a lawsuit over a possession issue that could take years to resolve, our smart landlord-clients offer “cash for keys” to some tenants who are particularly difficult. This can work well to expedite a tenant’s exit from the property.

Happy New Year to all my faithful readers!!                                                                                   S

Stuart A. Lautin, Esq.*

*Board Certified, Commercial (1989) and Residential (1988) Real Estate Law,
Texas Board of Legal Specialization

Licensed in the States of Texas and New York

Higier Allen & Lautin, PC
2711 N. Haskell Avenue, Suite 2400
Dallas Texas 75204
P: 972.716.1888
E: slautin@higierallen.com
W: www.higierallen.com


Reprinted with the permission of the North Texas Commercial Association of REALTORS®, Inc. 

Whoops Moments

Case One

In 2007 the Charles R. Tips Family Trust and the Hazel W. Tips Family Trust signed a Note to Patriot Bank. The Note was secured by Harris County real estate pursuant to a Deed of Trust and Security Agreement. Charles Watkins, Trustee of both Trusts, also guaranteed the debt.

The Note, Deed of Trust and Guaranty Agreement all described the principal amount of the loan as:

ONE MILLION SEVEN THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($1,700,000.00) DOLLARS.

This language appears five times in the three documents, in exactly the same format each time.

The Trusts made Note payments of approx $600,000. The bank sold the note to PB Commercial, LLC, who sold the property at foreclosure auction for $874,125.

PB, as plaintiff in the lawsuit against the Trusts and Watkins, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Assuming an initial principal balance of $1.7 million, PB calculated a deficiency balance of $815,214.

The Trusts and Watkins responded by claiming that the original principal amount was $1,007,000, and that words prevail over numbers when there is a conflict. According to the Trusts and Watkins, after application of the past payments and foreclosure proceeds, the note was fully satisfied and PB collected a surplus of $189,111, which amount should be returned to the Trusts.

The trial court granted PB’s Motion and awarded PB damages of $815,214 plus interest, court costs and attorney’s fees. The Trusts and Watkins appealed.

After concluding that the loan documents were *not* ambiguous, the Court found that the written words control over the numerals – a difference of $693,000.  The Court made this conclusion even after reviewing PB’s evidence that the borrowers had received the full $1.7 million from Patriot Bank, not $1,007,000.

Conclusion: The amount due was determined by the written words, not the numerals. The trial court’s Judgment is reversed and replaced with a new Judgment that the principal amount of the loan was $1,007,000. See Charles R. Tips Family Trust v. PB Commercial, LLC; No. 01-13-00449-CV; Texas Court of Appeals, 1^st District; March 25, 2015.

Case Two

On December 15, 2008, David Duckworth borrowed $1.1 million for the State Bank of Toulon. The Note was dated and signed December 15, but the Security Agreement was dated two days earlier – December 13, 2008.

The Security Agreement properly reflected the debt to be secured, but the identification had a critical mistake. The Security Agreement said that it secured a Note dated December 13, 2008. But there was no note of that date.

Duckworth filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2010. The bankruptcy court held that the mistaken date in the security agreement did not defeat the bank’s security interest. The trustee appealed, claiming that the mistaken date in the Security Agreement defeated the bank’s collateral interest.

The bank contended that the Security Agreement is enforceable, and extrinsic testimony will show clearly that the parties intended the Security Agreement to reflect the proper date of the Note. And that the Security Agreement could easily be changed by the Court – we call this ‘reformed’ – to reflect the proper date.

This Federal Court then concluded, and I’ll spare you the meat-grinder details, that the mistaken identity of the debt to be secured cannot be corrected against the bankruptcy trustee. The judgments of the district court were reversed. The Trustee wins; the Bank loses. See In Re: David L. Duckworth; State Bank of Toulon v. Charles E. Covey, Trustee; No. 1:13-cv-01258-JBM and 1:13-cv-01087-JES; US Court of Appeals, 7^th Circuit; November 21, 2014.

Lessons learned:

1.  In the past, I followed the ancient tradition of using both words and numerals in the docs I prepared. I quit that practice. Now I just use numerals - $1,245,882. No more words. Too many opportunities for a mistake by using words. And inevitably when there is a mistake, it’s in the words – not the numerals.

2.  Proofread your Leases, Contracts, correspondence, emails, texts, listings, buyer or tenant rep agreements, brokerage contracts, commission agreements, everything. Read it all closely. Then wait at least one hour before you read it again.

3.  Practice Point: On the really important stuff, enlist the help of a buddy to proofread too. 

Reprinted with the permission of North Texas Commercial Association of REALTORS®, Inc.

Indemnity Equals Guaranty

Michael Smuck and Edwin White wanted to purchase an apartment complex known as “The Falls,” located generally in the southeast quadrant of I-30 and Loop 820 in Fort Worth. They formed a special purpose entity (SPE) called MBS-The Falls, Ltd. for that purpose, and yet another SPE to serve as the general partner of MBS-The Falls.

To acquire the apartments, MBS-The Falls signed a $9 million note, deed of trust, security agreement and other loan docs pledging the real estate. Wells Fargo Bank became the owner of the loan docs through an assignment.

The loan provided for non-recourse financing. As such, the liability of MBS-The Falls was limited to its equity in the apartment complex, unless a non-recourse exception was triggered. The non-recourse exceptions that could impose liability upon MBS-The Falls were listed in the Note.

MBS-The Falls defaulted on the Note, and Wells Fargo foreclosed. Wells Fargo filed suit in Tarrant County alleging waste and that the owner allowed liens to be filed against the property, which impaired the value of Wells’ collateral.

At trial in Tarrant County, Wells Fargo obtained a judgment against MBS-The Falls for $10+ million. With that judgment in hand, Wells Fargo then sued Messrs. Smuck and White in Harris County for that amount. Wells Fargo claimed that Smuck and White were 100% liable for the judgment obtained in Tarrant County against the owner of the apartments.

The basis for Wells’ Harris County lawsuit is contained in a document signed personally by Smuck and White captioned “Non-Recourse Indemnification Agreement.” In that agreement both Smuck and White agreed to indemnify the lender for all losses incurred.

Smuck argued that he would be liable to Wells Fargo only if a third-party asserted a claim, and not merely if Wells Fargo had incurred losses.

White claimed that the judgment rendered in Tarrant County was not based on the non-recourse exceptions, and further that Wells Fargo failed to establish that any non-recourse exceptions had been triggered.

The Harris County court agreed with Smuck and White. Wells Fargo appealed.

The Harris County Court of Appeals first looked at the Indemnification Agreement. Despite the terminology of “Indemnity,” the Court had little problem concluding that it was essentially a “Guaranty,” for which Smuck and White were jointly and severally 100% liable for all losses suffered by Wells Fargo.

And from there it wasn’t difficult for the Court of Appeals to toss out all the secondary arguments used by Smuck and White.

The Harris County Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. Wells Fargo won; Smuck and White lost.

See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smuck and White; No. 14-12-00574-CV; Texas 14^th Court of Appeals, July 9, 2013.

Lessons learned:

1.   It’s easy to be lazy and not carefully read loan docs, leases and contracts; goodness knows they are as boring as watching a little league baseball game. In August. In Texas. With a 4p start time. The only surprise here is that Smuck and White were able to convince a trial court that the Indemnity Agreement they signed did not impose liability on them for Wells Fargo’s substantial losses.

2.  Don’t assume that non-recourse means no liability can be imposed. There is a new theory being used across the nation right now that even diminishment in value caused by recessionary market conditions can impose personal liability. Most of us don’t think that was the real purpose of non-recourse, “bad boy” or “carve out” provisions but at least some Courts do not agree.

3.  Come see me at the NTCAR Commercial Real Estate Expo on August 28 at the Sheraton in downtown Dallas, and tell me how I can approve these articles and what I should write about. I’ve got a booth!


Reprinted with the permission of North Texas Commercial Association of REALTORS®, Inc.

8.00% interest = 00.00% or maybe 5.00%

In 2008 Aneita Weaver loaned her nephew John Jamar $193,000 so that John could purchase a Harris County townhouse. The two parties prepared and signed a loan agreement, without the help of lawyers or title agents. That was their first (well maybe their second) mistake.

The funds were loaned at 8.00% interest for one year. Jamar was supposed to pay Weaver $1,400 per month during the term of the loan, which by my math establishes an amortization of 31.5 years.

The loan agreement stated: “If the . . . property does not sell [by January 1, 2010, then] . . . Aneita J. Weaver has the right to assume the title to the property free and clear from John Jamar, for the balance of the loan.”

Seriously. That’s what it says.

Jamar neither sold the property by January 1, 2010, nor did he make his payments to Weaver. So Weaver sued, asking the trial court for specific performance under the loan agreement, unpaid interest at the stated rate of 8.00% and attorney’s fees.

Weaver sued because Jamar did not sign a Deed of Trust, which would have otherwise allowed her to foreclose. Without a Deed of Trust Weaver’s only choices were to ignore the default or assert a lawsuit and ask the Court to force Jamar to convey the property to her.

Weaver won the case. The trial court ordered Jamar to convey the Property to Weaver. However, Weaver did not receive 8.00% interest in the Judgment. Instead, the trial court awarded her only 5.00% interest on all post-judgment amounts.

So Weaver appealed.

The Appellate Court looked at the security clause and focused on Weaver’s right to “. . . assume the title to the property . . . for the balance of the loan.”

The Court decided that the everyday meaning of “balance” includes principal and interest. And that Weaver’s exercise of her right to get title to the townhouse extinguished the balance of the loan, including interest.

So, Weaver’s interest rate of 8.00% was reduced to 00%. However, once the Judgment was entered by the trial court, the full Judgment amount accrued interest at the statutorily-mandated rate of 5.00%. Which wasn’t quite as painful. But still.

All of this pain was caused by the preparation by the parties of their own loan agreement, written with terms and provisions they could understand. And we can appreciate that.

But the other side is that Weaver was inadequately protected. I shudder to think of her legal expenses to clean up this mess, when a properly worded Promissory Note and Deed of Trust would likely have avoided both courthouses entirely.

See Weaver v. Jamar; 14-11-00516-CV; Texas Court of Appeals 14^th District; October 30, 2012.

Lessons learned:

1.      Loan documents written by non-lawyers cause problems.

2.      Loan docs with problems generate lawsuits.

3.      Lawsuits keep lawyers employed.

4.      It is probable that Weaver and Jamar could have avoided the Courthouse if they had proper loan docs.

Reprinted with the permission of North Texas Commercial Association of REALTORS®, Inc.

Commercial Foreclosures and Correction Deeds

It is rare that The Supremes review a real estate case. But in December 2009 the Texas Supreme Court decided Myrad Properties vs. LaSalle Bank. The case was about a timely subject – Texas foreclosure.

Myrad financed two apartment communities in Killeen with LaSalle Bank NA’s predecessor. Myrad signed a $1 million note and a deed of trust. The deed of trust was recorded in Bell County. The deed of trust contained separate property descriptions for both the Casa Grande Apartments and La Casa Apartments.

Myrad defaulted. LaSalle Bank posted a notice of foreclosure upon only the Casa Grande property. At the foreclosure auction in Bell County, the substitute trustee read only the property description for Casa Grande. LaSalle was the only bidder, offering almost $1 million.

LaSalle received and recorded a substitute trustee’s deed for the Casa Grande property.

Two days later Myrad sued LaSalle, to keep it from filing a correction deed covering the La Casa property. When LaSalle filed it anyway, Myrad asserted that LaSalle owned only the Casa Grande property, while Myrad retained ownership of La Casa free of LaSalle’s deed of trust lien.

Both the trial court and court of appeals held that LaSalle’s correction deed was effective to transfer ownership of both Casa Grande and La Casa to LaSalle.

The Texas Supreme Court reviewed the history of correction deeds and determined that such deeds can be used to correct minor defects and imperfections. However, correction deeds cannot be used to convey additional, separate properties. The correction deed filed by LaSalle was void.

Bottom line:
1. Foreclosures are risky business.
2. Purchasers at foreclosure auctions sometimes make mistakes. So do lenders. Trustees too.
3. Be wary of correction deeds.


Reprinted with the permission of North Texas Commercial Association of REALTORS®, Inc.