Thursday, June 29, 2023

ARE HOTEL GUESTS TENANTS?

             Efficiency Lodge advertises as an extended stay motel; its website invites guests to “Stay a nite [sic] or stay forever.”

            Armetrius Neason, Lynetrice Preston, and Altonese Weaver each occupied their rooms for months or years. Neason remains there still, but Preston and Weaver have left.

            When the three Plaintiffs first moved in, they each signed a rental agreement. The agreements stated that “The relationship of Innkeeper and Guest shall apply and not the relationship of Landlord and Tenant.” Each referred multiple times to the occupant and Lodge as Guest and Innkeeper.

            The agreements provided that payment was due weekly, while management reserved the right to enter for housekeeping and maintenance. The agreements also addressed the term of occupancy, but the blanks were never completed.

            One of the agreements allowed the occupant to remain on a week-to-week basis, while another agreement specified that the occupant could remain “for 180 days straight,” after which she would have to vacate for two days before she could return.

            All three Plaintiffs contend that they used the Lodge as their home; the Lodge does not contest this assertion.

            In 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, all three Plaintiffs were unable to pay Lodge. Weaver was locked out of her room, although the other two Plaintiffs were not.

            Neason, Preston and Weaver sued the Lodge. They asked for an injunction prohibiting the Lodge from removing them without formal eviction proceedings, and for damages to compensate Weaver for the lockout. The trial court granted the injunction, determining that Plaintiffs used the Lodge as their long-term home.

            The Lodge appealed.

The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the contracts signed between Plaintiffs and the Lodge were ambiguous about the nature of the legal relationship. The appellate court noted that Plaintiffs had lived at the Lodge for a long time, that each brought many personal items with them, and that they used the Lodge as their home address for official purposes. As a result, the court of appeals determined that the Lodge is required to process formal eviction proceedings to remove the Plaintiffs.

So the Lodge appealed to the Supreme Court. The high Court reviewed the facts and applicable law.

            Under the law, tenants must be evicted through a court procedure while guests can simply be precluded from entering their rooms. Innkeepers are required to receive a written statement establishing the period during which a guest may occupy a room. At expiration, an innkeeper can change door locks or otherwise prohibit the guest from entering, without court involvement.

            The Supreme Court first analyzed the structure of a landlord-tenant relationship, which grants a right of possession, enjoyment, and use. Although not stated, the implication is that an estate in land is contemplated in each LL-T scenario. And similarly, a motel or hotel guest has less, more like a license or limited contractual right.

            Possession of the premises is a factor and use of the property as a “home” and “dwelling place” is evidence of a LL-T relationship. The ability to accept and preclude visitors and third parties can also be an important factor in finding or negating the existence of a LL-T structure.

            However, a LL-T relationship is not determined by a person’s subjective belief that a property is used as a home. And of course commercial tenants do not use their premises as a residence, but yet the LL-T foundation is undeniable.

            So the Supreme Court lands exactly where it should, by asking about the intent of the parties. If the agreement is clear then there is no reason to ask further questions. If unclear, extrinsic evidence is needed to explain and resolve the ambiguities.

Parol evidence might also include the parties’ course of conduct, as shown by their actions.

            In that vein, the Supreme Court asks if the Plaintiffs decorated and furnished the premises, cleaned and maintained the room, entertained guests, altered the locks, and changed or added security devices. Or, maybe the Plaintiffs had those rights but ignored them, and instead the innkeeper tightly controlled access, maintained and cleaned, allowed and prohibited guests and set hours, and prohibited anyone from changing door locks and adding security equipment.

            The high Court concludes that the LL-T relationship is created by the transfer of possession, while the innkeeper-guest structure is “marked by the payment of a fee ‘for the purpose of entertainment’ at an inn.” Both court of appeals and trial court decisions are vacated; the case is returned to the trial court to start over and more closely examine the precise relationship of the parties with specific emphasis on the contracts and other related evidence.

See Efficiency Lodge v. Neason; Case No. S22G0838; Supreme Court of Georgia; June 21, 2023: https://casetext.com/case/efficiency-lodge-inc-v-neason-2.

            Questions / Issues:

  1. The legal difference between a tenant and guest is a common issue. The former is entitled to all the protections of law; the latter has virtually none. Hotel and motel contracts are often non-existent, or if there is one it is poorly written on an index card, and not signed by both parties. This well-reasoned decision merits review to understand how at least one Supreme Court makes the distinction between tenant and guest.
  1. If you are a landlord, there is likely nothing you can do to recharacterize your tenant as a guest. If however you own a hotel or motel, or perhaps your mother-in-law is overstaying her welcome at your humble abode, it may be pivotal to examine the relationship closely before you conclude that your occupant is merely a guest, subject to virtually no protection under law, and you prevent entry. Because if you guess wrong, the damages could be steep.
  1. Is this yet another situation where the State legislature could help? Perhaps paying guests could be automatically converted to tenants after six months of continued occupancy without default, while all others remain guests. Wouldn’t most paying guests be surprised to learn they have no legal protection after six months of room possession?

                                                                                    Stuart A. Lautin, Esq.*

 

* Board Certified, Commercial (1989) and Residential (1988) Real Estate Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization

Licensed in the States of Texas and New York

  

Reprinted with the permission of North Texas Commercial Association of REALTORS®, Inc.

Tuesday, May 30, 2023

ARE TITLE AGENTS FIDUCIARIES?

            Sam Higgins continuously owned one parcel of real property for the last 50 years. A deed was recorded on August 8, 2017, whereby Higgins conveyed it to CETA Invest Austin.

            CETA then agreed to sell it to Juanita William for $200k.

            On September 20, 2017, William offered to assign her purchase right to Houndstooth Capital for a $5k profit, and a contract was executed between William, CETA, and Houndstooth. Evidently the owner of Houndstooth thought that the asset was undervalued by $100k. Closing was scheduled for September 29, 2017, but was delayed when the title agent discovered in the County records a Memo of Purchase and Sale.

            William explained that she had previously assigned purchase contracts on the target asset and adjacent properties, heirship issues had been discovered, a previous assignee backed out of the deal, so William elected to find another buyer.

            Houndstooth approached the title agent with this issue, and was assured that the target asset had no heirship issues.

            The deal closed on October 6, 2017. The title agent had obtained a title commitment from WGF National Title Insurance Company. At Closing, the title agent produced a document to be executed by Houndstooth which provided that the agent may be unable or unwilling to issue an Owner Title Policy even though a premium had been paid, as a final down-date search could result in adverse findings.

            Houndstooth delivered $205k to the agent’s escrow account, as required by the contract. A Deed from CETA to Houndstooth was executed, and the agent wired the sale proceeds to CETA.

            Bank of America alerted the title agent, one week after Closing, that CETA was attempting to withdraw all of the closing proceeds from an account that had been recently opened. Which created a fraud alert. So BoA stopped payment on the withdrawal request.

            On October 18, 2017, the title agent informed Houndstooth that no title policy would be issued, the premium paid for the title policy would not be returned, and the escrowed funds would not be reimbursed, all because the chain of title had been questioned based on BoA’s fraud warning.

            On October 27, 2017, Higgins (recall that he had owned the realty for the last 50 years) signed a Fraud Affidavit stating that the deed transferring the real estate to CETA was a forgery.

            Subsequently, BoA sent $64k to the title agent who, in turn, sent it to Houndstooth one year after receipt by the agent. The US Secret Service recovered an additional $70k and returned that amount to Houndstooth, leaving Houndstooth to suffer a $71k loss.

            Houndstooth sued the title agent and WFG for breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, negligence, and violations of the Insurance Code. The trial court rendered judgment that Houndstooth take nothing on its claims.

            Houndstooth appealed.

            After disposing of claims related to fraud, negligence, breach of contract, and others, the Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of fiduciary duty. The Court reported that the agent’s duties were limited to the Closing and proper disbursal of earnest monies. Those duties did not extend to title investigation or title defect disclosure.

            The Court then reviewed the obligations of the title insurer, WFG. In this case and although title underwriters can also perform escrow duties, WFG merely acted as a title insurer. As such, WFG never became a fiduciary to Houndstooth.

            The title agent and underwriter win again. See Houndstooth Capital Real Estate v. Maverick Title of Texas and WFG National Title Insurance Company; Case No. 03-21-00093-CV; Texas Court of Appeals, Third District at Austin; February 28, 2023: https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/third-court-of-appeals/2023/03-21-00093-cv.html.

            Questions / Issues:

  1. Presumably a Lender would require detailed escrow instructions to be signed by the title agent or escrow officer, prohibiting the underwriter to deny coverage after Closing. But how does the Buyer seek protection from this? Sophisticated commercial purchasers will also use escrow instructions, but my sense is that virtually all of the closings in which buyers do not engage lawyers will potentially leave such buyers exposed to fraud and negligence claims.
  1. It is not uncommon for parties to allow a title agent to hold funds, but on the day of closing demand that the escrow holder transfer all funds to the national title insurance company for escrow disbursement that day. Would that have given this buyer better protection?
  1. Is this a situation where the State legislature or Insurance Commissioner needs to step up, perhaps to allow the agent to sell an additional endorsement for an added modest fee that would provide both escrow and title coverage after the premium is paid but before the policies are issued?
                                                                                    Stuart A. Lautin, Esq.*

 

* Board Certified, Commercial (1989) and Residential (1988) Real Estate Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization

Licensed in the States of Texas and New York

  

Reprinted with the permission of North Texas Commercial Association of REALTORS®, Inc.

 

Friday, April 28, 2023

LEASE RENEWAL OPTIONS REQUIRE EXACT COMPLIANCE. RIGHT?

            Robert and Dorothy Pitz owned a 320-acre farm. In 1988, M/M Pitz agreed to lease six acres to US Cell Corporation for a cell tower. US Cell then constructed a 380-foot tall cell tower on the farmland.

            The lease term commenced November 14, 1988.

            Rent was $20,000 for the total 30-year lease term, payable in one sum not later than January 5, 1989. That equates to $666.67 per year. A whopping $55.55 per month.

            The Lease contained a renewal option for 30 more years. To exercise it, US Cell was required to send notice at least 60 days before term expiration and pay $20,000 “at the exercise of the option,” as increased by CPI.

            In 2009 M/M Pitz transferred ownership of the farm to their son, William Pitz, and his spouse Lynn. US Cell was not advised of the conveyance, although the Deed was recorded.

            US Cell sent a certified letter of lease renewal exercise to Robert and Dorothy Pitz on September 1, 2017 – more than one year before the September 14, 2018 deadline. US Cell’s letter contained IRS Form W-9 and a direct deposit form.

There was no rent payment accompanying the letter. Instead, the letter advised that “Once we have these documents [W-9 and deposit form], we will be able to disburse the option rental payment to you.”

No response was made to US Cell’s letter. So on October 29, US Cell sent to Will and Lynn a check for $41,439, less income tax withholding, intended to represent advance rent for the 30-year option term.

Will and Lynn returned the payment with an explanation that the payment was not tendered at the time of renewal exercise. As required by the Lease. And therefore the renewal term was not properly exercised.

Will and Lynn filed a lawsuit for declaratory judgment on June 19, 2019, asking for a determination that the option had not been properly exercised since payment was not timely made. The district court concluded that US Cell had indeed properly exercised the renewal option because rental payment was not a condition precedent.

Will and Lynn appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. So Will and Lynn further appealed to the Court of Last Resort.

The Supreme Court commenced its analysis by stating that renewal option exercise must strictly comply with all conditions precedent. The Court dug out a case from civil war years to support the conclusion that both notice and payment are required to effectively renewal a lease.

 Then, the Court used the phrase “On the other hand” to signify a sea-shift change in ideology. Not finding a hard notice-and-payment provision as found in other contracts, the Court viewed the option-to-renew provision in isolation – not connected to the obligation-to-pay-rent sentence. The Supreme Court, struggling with precedent to support the position it wanted to reach, turned to cases from North Dakota and Illinois.

Deciding that there is “less absurdity than might appear at first blush,” US Cell is evidently allowed to send notice of lease renewal without tendering the prepaid rent, even though both are clearly required by the Lease.

US Cell wins, again; Will and Lynn lose. Again.

See Pitz v. US Cellular Operating Company; Case No. 22-0038; Supreme Court of Iowa; April 21, 2023: https://cases.justia.com/iowa/supreme-court/2023-22-0038.pdf?ts=1682085886.

             Questions / Issues:

  1. Maybe I am the one that is in isolation, but this is not the result I had anticipated. In most States, renewal options are strictly construed and deviation is now allowed. This option required both notice and payment. Only one of the two conditions was satisfied.
  1. Note that Lease Section 3.2 contained the option renewal verbiage; Section 4.2 stated the new rent requirement. Would merely reordering the provisions have saved the intent of the parties? What if the timing for renewal (60 days), method of renewal (written notice), and rent obligation (prepaid for the term; old rent + CPI) were all combined in Section 3.2 – would that have saved it from this disastrous result? Or was this Supreme Court intent on forging new law to give other tenants and lessees some breathing room, unless or until fixed by the Iowa legislature?

 

                                                                                    Stuart A. Lautin, Esq.*


* Board Certified, Commercial (1989) and Residential (1988) Real Estate Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization

Licensed in the States of Texas and New York

  

Reprinted with the permission of North Texas Commercial Association of REALTORS®, Inc.